Sex and Gender Identity: Byrne’s Philosophical Perspective

Trouble with gender: 

Sex facts, gender fictions

  By Alex Byrne

  Reviewed by

  Geoffrey W. Sutton

CITE REVIEW: 

Sutton, G. W. (2025). Sex and gender identity: Byrne’s philosophical perspective Interdisciplinary Book Reviews.

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Woman:

the female human being (Collins Dictionary)

an adult who lives and identifies as female though they may have been considered to have a different sex at birth... (Cambridge Dictionary)

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The challenges surrounding sex and gender extend beyond conceptual debates to encompass the psychological toll experienced by individuals grappling with gender identity, particularly in the face of restrictive laws and policies that constrain personal freedoms and rights. Having completed reading Byrne’s Trouble with Gender last week, I found its arguments especially resonant in light of recent events. On Saturday, I attended a local Pridefest event that celebrated gender diversity and inclusion. Today, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Tennessee law banning gender-affirming care for minors, a decision that underscores the urgency of the issues Byrne addresses (Totenberg, 2025, June 18). His book emerges as a timely and provocative contribution to the ongoing discourse on sex, gender, and the role of public institutions in shaping both.

Book Summary

Alex Byrne’s Trouble with Gender: Sex Facts, Gender Fictions (2024) is a philosophical examination of the conceptual and linguistic confusions surrounding the terms sex, gender, and gender identity. Written for a general audience but grounded in analytic philosophy, the book aims to clarify the meanings and implications of these terms, particularly in legal, medical, and social contexts. Byrne’s central thesis is that much of the current discourse on gender is conceptually muddled, and that this confusion has significant consequences for public policy and individual rights.

Byrne begins by distinguishing between sex and gender, arguing that sex is a biological category—male or female—while gender is a more ambiguous term that has been used to refer to identity, roles, expression, and social constructs. He critiques the tendency in contemporary discourse to conflate these concepts, noting that such conflation leads to both theoretical and practical problems. For example, when legal or medical documents refer to gender without specifying whether they mean sex or identity, the resulting ambiguity can affect everything from healthcare provision to anti-discrimination law.

Bryne examines the near universal conviction that children have a core gender identity. He argues that although one’s core gender identity is fixed early on, the evidence for innate gender identity is weak and that the concept of gender identity itself is poorly defined. This analysis leads to a discussion of understanding the concept of gender dysphoria and associated concepts of sex and gender related to the experience.

Byrne also addresses the question, “What is a woman?”—a question that has become politically and philosophically contentious. He defends a biological answer: a woman is an adult human female. This definition, he argues, is not only consistent with ordinary language and scientific usage but also necessary for maintaining clarity in discussions about sex-based rights and protections. He acknowledges that this view is controversial within academic philosophy, where many scholars advocate for more inclusive or socially constructed definitions. However, Byrne maintains that abandoning biological definitions in favor of identity-based ones undermines the coherence of legal and ethical frameworks that rely on sex distinctions.

The book further explores the implications of gender ideology in institutional settings. Byrne critiques the adoption of gender identity language in schools, healthcare, and law, arguing that it often leads to the suppression of dissent and the marginalization of alternative viewpoints. He is particularly concerned about the impact on children, noting that the uncritical affirmation of gender identity can result in irreversible medical interventions based on contested theories. Byrne calls for a more cautious and evidence-based approach, emphasizing the importance of open debate and philosophical rigor.

Throughout the book, Byrne employs a method of conceptual analysis, a hallmark of analytic philosophy. He dissects key terms and arguments, exposing inconsistencies and ambiguities. For instance, he examines the use of “transgender child” as a noun, arguing that it presupposes the existence of a child who is, in some essential sense, of the opposite sex. This, he claims, is a conceptual error that has been uncritically adopted in legal and medical discourse. Byrne suggests that such usage reflects a broader trend of ideological capture, where academic and professional institutions adopt contested theories without sufficient scrutiny.

Byrne is careful to distinguish between philosophical critique and personal animus. He affirms the rights and dignity of transgender individuals and supports legal protections against discrimination. However, he insists that these commitments do not require the acceptance of flawed conceptual frameworks. In fact, he argues that clear thinking about sex and gender is essential for crafting just and effective policies. He warns against the tendency to silence dissenting voices, noting that philosophy thrives on the open exchange of ideas, even when those ideas are unpopular.

The book concludes with a call for intellectual humility and philosophical integrity. Byrne urges scholars, policymakers, and the public to engage in civil discourse about sex and gender, grounded in reason and evidence rather than ideology. He acknowledges the emotional and political sensitivities involved but maintains that clarity and rigor are indispensable for addressing the complex issues at stake.

In sum, Trouble with Gender is a provocative and meticulously argued contribution to the philosophy of sex and gender. Byrne challenges prevailing orthodoxies with clarity and precision, offering a framework for understanding gender that is both philosophically robust and socially consequential. While the book is likely to be controversial, it provides a valuable resource for anyone seeking to navigate the conceptual terrain of contemporary gender debates.

Comments on Trouble with Gender

Byrne’s philosophical analysis in Trouble with Gender invites careful readers to reconsider how we conceptualize sex and gender. His call for greater precision in the use of terms such as sex and gender—terms often conflated not only in everyday discourse but also inconsistently applied by experts—is both timely and necessary. I appreciate his challenge to writers and scholars alike to adopt more rigorous language in navigating these complex domains.

It is likely that some who assert the existence of only two sexes will appropriate Byrne’s arguments to support a binary framework. However, such an interpretation would be reductive. Human sexuality encompasses more than the dichotomy of gametes. Variations in sexual anatomy, chromosomal patterns, and hormonal profiles complicate any simplistic binary. Moreover, identity itself—how individuals understand and experience their gender—adds further nuance. While Byrne emphasizes a biological definition of sex, it would be a misreading to suggest that he disregards the lived realities of transgender individuals or the significance of sexuality in their lives.

Rejecting Byrne’s position does not require wholesale acceptance of the view that gender is merely a social construct. There are, indeed, sophisticated and influential theories—such as Judith Butler’s concept of gender performativity—that offer alternative frameworks for understanding gender as enacted and socially mediated (see Szorenyi, 2022). As a psychologist, however, my perspective is shaped by a focus on the individual’s sense of self, which integrates biological, psychological, and social dimensions. While biology and cultural norms exert powerful influences, individuals are not passive recipients of these forces. Rather, they actively interpret and respond to interpersonal experiences, sexual development, anatomical and hormonal variation, and broader social structures such as religion and law. These influences are filtered through the mind, particularly when they give rise to psychological distress—whether transient or enduring.

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REFERENCES

Byrne, A. (2024). Trouble with gender: Sex facts, gender fictions. Polity Press. [AMAZON]

Szorenyi, A. (2022, October 19). Judith Butler: their philosophy of gender explained. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/judith-butler-their-philosophy-of-gender-explained-192166

Totenberg, N. (2025, June 18). Supreme Court upholds Tennessee law that bars gender-affirming care for minors. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2025/06/18/nx-s1-5421276/scotus-transgender-kids-decision

Book Author

Alex Byrne is a philosopher and professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he holds the Laurance S. Rockefeller Chair. His work spans philosophy of mind, epistemology, and metaphysics, with a focus on perception, self-knowledge, and the philosophy of sex and gender. He is the author of Trouble with Gender and Transparency and Self-Knowledge.

Review Author

Geoffrey W. Sutton, Professor Emeritus of Psychology at Evangel University, holds a master’s degree in counseling and a PhD in psychology from the University of Missouri-Columbia. His postdoctoral work encompassed education and supervision in forensic and neuropsychology. As a licensed psychologist, he conducted clinical and neuropsychological evaluations and provided psychotherapy for patients in various settings, including schools, hospitals, and private offices. During his tenure as a professor, Dr. Sutton taught courses on psychotherapy, assessment, and research. He has authored over one hundred publications, including books, book chapters, and articles in peer-reviewed psychology journals. His website is https://suttong.com